

Safety Action Notice

Reference **SAN(SC)20/03**

Issued **02 April 2020**

Review Date **02 April 2021**

Interruption of high flow nasal oxygen during transfer

Source: This Safety Action Notice is issued in association with NHS Improvement and Healthcare Improvement Scotland. The content is based on Patient Safety Alert NatPSA/2020/002/NHSPS, issued by NHS Improvement on 01 Apr 2020

Summary

Interruption of high flow nasal oxygen during transfer may result in serious harm. The actions in this alert will help to reduce the immediate risk although longer term actions may also be required.

Action

1. Identify all devices used to provide HFNO that do not have an in-built transport mode.
2. Add clear and visible labels to these HFNO delivery devices stating:
 - a. even brief interruptions to mains power supply will lead to interruption of oxygen therapy and subsequent respiratory or cardiac arrest.
 - b. do not start HFNO in any emergency department or short stay unit without a plan for how to transfer the patient onwards.
3. If your organisation has already purchased UPS device/s to use with HFNO:
 - a. identify a storage place for your UPS that can be accessed 24/7
 - b. label all HFNO devices with the location of a compatible UPS
 - c. allocate responsibility for ensuring the UPS is returned, charged and prepared for next use.

Action by

- Acute and specialist hospital providers (adult and children's hospitals)

Deadlines for action

Actions complete: 09 Apr 2020

Problem / background

Specialised equipment is used to deliver high flow nasal oxygen (HFNO) to babies, children and adults in acute respiratory failure without hypercapnia.¹ **Current national guidance² (see Note) states that HFNO is not advocated in COVID-19 patients based on lack of efficacy, oxygen use and infection spread; if used temporarily, or for other patients, it must be included as part of the daily count of the number of high flow ventilatory systems in use.³**

Some HFNO delivery devices have a transport mode, but most require mains power and will not deliver oxygen during transfer* unless attached to a compatible uninterruptible

power supply (UPS) device. Four deaths have been identified (not Scotland) in a recent two-year period from interrupted HFNO during patient transfer; further reports described hypoxia, cyanosis, collapse and respiratory arrest. Review of these incidents suggests:

- some staff may assume devices have an internal battery
- staff do not realise how rapidly the patient is likely to deteriorate with even brief interruption of HFNO
- a misconception is that less intensive methods of oxygen delivery (e.g. reservoir masks with an oxygen cylinder on full flow) are an adequate substitute during transfer; however, most patients requiring HFNO need more intensive intervention such as intubation if HFNO is interrupted
- staff have no obvious visual cue to the criticality of HFNO and may confuse it with low-flow nasal oxygen
- emergency departments starting a patient on HFNO then find they have no access to a supplementary battery source or transport mode to move the patient safely out of the department.

In the longer term, purchasing additional equipment supported by the manufacturer of your HFNO device, and redesigning patient pathways, protocols and staff training could address the underlying causes, but the actions in this alert help reduce the immediate risk.

* *'Transfer' in the context of this alert means between wards, departments and rooms within a hospital; HFNO is not used for ambulance transfer between hospitals.*

Distribution

Anaesthetics	Medical	Operating Departments
Device Managers	Medical Physics	Paediatrics
Emergency Department	Neonatal	Resuscitation Teams
Estates and Facilities	Nursing	Risk Management
Health & Safety	O.D.A.s	Supplies/Procurement
Intensive Therapy Units	O.D.P.s	

Patient Safety Incident Data

A search of the NRLS for incidents reported as occurring on or after 01.10.2017 and uploaded to the NRLS by 06.11.2019 was carried out using a combination of keywords (NHSI reference PS1498). All incidents reported as death, severe harm or moderate harm were reviewed. Extrapolation from review of samples of incidents reported as no or low harm indicated about 150 for this period concerned issues with transferring a patient who relied on HFNO.

Patients affected ranged from age 1 month to 85 years, but most incidents occurred in those aged 1 month to 1 year range and 66 to 75 years. Four deaths appeared to be directly linked to issues with transferring a patient who relied on HFNO. One patient was known to be within hours/days of death and three were critically ill with unknown chances of survival, but the timing and cause of death appeared directly linked to the HFNO interruption. Other reported consequences included hypoxia, cyanosis, collapse and respiratory failure, and respiratory arrest.

References

1. BTS guideline for oxygen use in adults in healthcare and emergency settings. O'Driscoll B, Howard L, Earis J, et al. Thorax 2017; 72: i1–i90. <https://www.brit-thoracic.org.uk/document-library/guidelines/emergency-oxygen/bts-guideline-for-oxygen-use-in-healthcare-and-emergency-settings/>
2. NHS England and NHS Improvement: Guidance for the role and use of non-invasive respiratory support in adult patients with coronavirus (confirmed or suspected) 26 March 2020 Version 2 https://www.england.nhs.uk/coronavirus/wp-content/uploads/sites/52/2020/03/CLEARED_Specialty-guide_-_NIV-respiratory-support-and-coronavirus-v2-26-March-003.pdf
3. NHS England and NHS Improvement Estates & Facilities Patient Safety Alert 2020/001: Use of hospital CPAP during coronavirus epidemic 31 March 2020 (this EFA was distributed in Scotland as IM/2020/005 on 2 April 2020) <https://www.cas.mhra.gov.uk/ViewandAcknowledgment/ViewAlert.aspx?AlertID=103013>

Resources

1. Airway Management. ICM Anaesthesia Covid-19 19 March 2020 <https://icmanaesthesiacovid-19.org/covid-19-airway-management-principles>
2. Critical Care preparation and management in the COVID-19 pandemic ICM Anaesthesia Covid-19 17 March 2020 <https://icmanaesthesiacovid-19.org/critical-care-preparation-and-management-in-the-covid-19-pandemic>
3. COVID-19: Guidance for infection prevention and control in healthcare settings. Version 1.1, 27 March 2020 Issued jointly by the Department of Health and Social Care, Public Health Wales, Public Health Agency Northern Ireland, Health Protection Scotland and Public Health England as official guidance. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/874316/Infection_prevention_and_control_guidance_for_pandemic_coronavirus.pdf
4. Clinical guide for the management of critical care patients during the coronavirus pandemic. Publications approval reference: 001559 <https://www.england.nhs.uk/coronavirus/wp-content/uploads/sites/52/2020/03/specialty-guide-itu-and-coronavirus-v1-16-march-2020.pdf>

Enquiries

Enquiries (and adverse incident reports) in Scotland should be addressed to:

Incident Reporting & Investigation Centre (IRIC)

NHS National Services Scotland

Gyle Square, 1 South Gyle Crescent, Edinburgh EH12 9EB

Tel: 0131 275 7575 Email: nss.irc@nhs.scot

Report options are available on the HFS website: [How to report an Adverse Incident](#)

Further information about reporting incidents can be found in [CEL 43 \(2009\)](#) or by contacting IRIC at the above address.

NHS National Services Scotland is the common name for the Common Services Agency for the Scottish Health Service.
www.nss.nhs.scot

© Crown Copyright 2020

Addressees may take copies for distribution within their own organisations